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KEYWORDS: criminal, supreme, swing
Criminal Procedure and the Florida Supreme Court in
1985 - Watching the Pendulum Swing
By Bruce A. Zimet*
Introduction
In 1985, the Florida Supreme Court addressed numerous impor-
tant issues relating to criminal procedure. This article will review and
analyze significant 1985 Florida Supreme Court decisions. The purpose
of this review and analysis is not to merely catalogue cases, but to ex-
plore the rationale and direction of the supreme court.
A cursory review of the Florida Supreme Court in 1985 reveals a
significant number of criminal procedure opinions relating to cases in
which the death penalty was imposed. This phenomenon is no doubt
attributed to the supreme court's constitutionally mandated jurisdic-
tional boundaries which limit direct appeal to the supreme court to fi-
nal judgments of trial courts imposing the death penalty.1 While the
Florida Constitution does not prohibit the Florida Supreme Court from
considering non-death penalty criminal procedure cases, as a practical
matter jurisdiction limitations restrict the volume of non-death penalty
cases. 2 The dominance of death penalty cases before the supreme court
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1. FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 3(b)(1) provides that the Supreme Court: "Shall hear
appeals from judgments of trial courts imposing the death penalty . .. .
2. The Florida Constitution does not impose any other mandatory jurisdiction
upon the supreme court for matters relating to criminal procedure other than direct
appeals from trial courts imposing the death penalty and decisions of the district courts
of appeal declaring invalid a state statute or a provision of the state constitution. FLA.
1
Zimet: Criminal Procedure and the Florida Supreme Court in 1985 - Watchi
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
Nova Law Journal
has created certain interesting characteristics. Obviously nearly all of
the death penalty cases devote analysis to issues which arise during the
"sentencing" phase of trial. These issues are generally limited in scope
and application to the unique circumstances of the "mini-trial" of the
death penalty sentencing.3 Additionally, the death penalty cases have
confronted the supreme court with a significant number of claims con-
cerning the effective assistance of counsel as well as allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct. Conversely, the jurisdictional boundaries of
the Florida Supreme Court, with the resultant overflow of death pen-
alty cases and unique issues, has limited the quantity of supreme court
decisions relating to certain traditional areas of criminal procedure
such as search and seizure, wiretaps, grand jury or fifth amendment
issues.
Right to Jury Trial
While the right to a jury trial is a fundamental component of Flor-
ida criminal procedure,4 the precise scope of that right has remained
uncertain. In 1985, the Florida Supreme Court sought to provide more
accurate definition of the right to a jury trial. The vehicle for review
was the supreme court's review in Reed v. State.'
In Reed, the supreme court considered the question of whether an
accused in a criminal mischief prosecution maintains a right to a jury
trial under the Florida and United States Constitutions.6 Reed was
CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
All other basis for jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court for matters relating
to criminal procedure are discretionary. See, FLA. CONsT. art. V § 3(b)(1). The practi-
cal result of the jurisdictional limitations on the supreme court has been to make deci-
sions of the intermediate courts of appeal (the district courts of appeal in felony crimi-
nal cases) final decisions. See, Florida Courts of Appeal: Intermediate Courts Become
Final, 13 STETSON L.REv. 479 (1984).
3. The sentencing hearing is authorized by Rule 3.780 Fla.R.Cr.P.. This article
will not seek to specifically address opinions which discuss issues raised in the sentenc-
ing phase of trial. Such a review and analysis is best suited for individual and specified
analysis.
4. The right to a jury trial is contained in Article III, Section 2 and the sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution. Additionally, the right to a jury trial is
contained in Article I, Sections 16 and 22 of the Florida Constitution.
5. 448 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
6. Reed had come before the court as a certified question of great public impor-
tance from the Fifth District Court of Appeal. Reed had been denied a jury trial in
county court. The circuit court, acting in its appellate capacity, determined that Reed
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charged with violation of Section 806.12(2)(a) Florida Statute (1981),
which carried a maximum punishment of a term of incarceration of
sixty days and/or a fine of up to $500. The Reed court considered the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Baldwin v. New York,7 in
which that Court concluded that an offense carrying a maximum pen-
alty in excess of six months was a "serious crime" which mandated a
jury trial. Reed, however, did not construe Baldwin as requiring that an
offense of less than six months as necessarily constituting a petty of-
fense which by definition did not require a jury trial. Instead, Reed,
relying upon District of Columbia v. Colts,8 provided that the classifi-
cation of a crime as a serious crime (requiring a jury trial) or a petty
offense (triable summarily without a jury) depended primarily upon the
nature of the offense. The Florida Supreme Court in Reed further re-
lied upon its previous holding in Whirley v. State,9 in which four clas-
ses of serious crimes (requiring jury trials) were enumerated. Those
classes included crimes indictable at common law; crimes involving
moral turpitude; crimes that are malum in se; and crimes carrying a
penalty in excess of six months incarceration. Utilizing that analysis,
the Florida Supreme Court in Reed found malicious mischief to be
rooted in the common law as well as have been malum in se and re-
quiring a jury trial under both the United States and Florida
Constitutions.
Jury Selection
The Florida Supreme Court addressed several challenges to trial
court rulings relating to the competency of potential jurors. In these
cases the court was careful to follow its well-established precedent that
the competency of a challenged juror was a discretionary decision of
the trial court which would not be disturbed absent a showing of mani-
fest error.10 In Ross v. State,"' the court rejected a claim of reversible
error based upon the trial court's denial of a motion to strike a prospec-
tive juror for cause due to the prospective juror's belief that she had
was entitled to a jury trial. The Fifth District granted a writ of certioari quashing the
circuit court order and certifying the ultimate question.
7. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
8. 282 U.S. 63 (1980).
9. 450 So. 2d 836, 838 (Fla. 1984).
10. See Christopher v. State, 407 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
910 (1982); Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1959).
11. 474 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1985).
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seen the prosecutor at a family reunion and the juror's uncertainty
whether the prosecutor was a distant relative of the juror's. The Florida
Supreme Court, in rejecting Ross' claim of error, reviewed Florida's
statutory provisions relating to challenge for cause based upon blood
relations between potential jurors and attorneys for parties. The court
in Ross concluded that the "abstract statements" made by the prospec-
tive juror failed to satisfy the statutory requirements that jurors may
be challenged for cause if the jurors are related within the third degree
to the attorneys of either party.1 2 Unfortunately, the opinion in Ross
does not discuss whether the prosecutor in question responded to the
statement of the prospective juror in order to provide the court with a
complete and accurate factual basis to determine the defendant's mo-
tion to challenge for cause. Additionally, the Ross opinion does not dis-
cuss whether Ross' counsel sought to further inquire of the juror con-
cerning her knowledge of the prosecutor. 13
In Mills v. State,4 the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's determination of juror competency and found no error in the
trial court's denial of a motion to excuse a potential juror for cause.
The questioned Mills juror is described in the court's opinion as having
a "distant relationship" 15 with the murder victim's family and an "ac-
quaintance with Mills and his family."10 In applying the court for an
order to excuse the juror for cause, Mills' trial counsel had represented
to the court that he had "independent information" that the questioned
juror had voiced an opinion that Mills was guilty during a conversation
with Mills' brother-in-law. The questioned juror denied that he had ex-
pressed an opinion concerning Mills' guilt during a conversation with
Mills' brother-in-law. The juror additionally stated that he could be
fair and impartial. When the trial court provided Mills' counsel with an
opportunity to provide the court with evidence of the alleged statement
of the juror concerning Mills' guilt, the attorney merely "repeat[ed] his
12. FLA. STAT. § 913.03(9) (1983).
13. Since trial attorneys are themselves provided voir dire examination, Rule
3.300(b). Fla. R.Cr.P., it would seem dubious that Ross' counsel would not have sought
to further explore the question.
Further, Ross should not be read as precluding trial courts from granting motions
to exclude for cause in situations where the requirements of Sec. 913.03(9) are not
satisfied.
14. 462 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 1985).
15. Id. at 1079.
16. Id.
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representations that the incident did occur.""7 The Mills court con-
cluded that the trial court properly concluded that the absence of evi-
dence to substantiate the claims of partiality did not negate the jurors'
insistence of imparitality. In reaching their decisions, the trial court
and supreme court implemented the criteria announced in Lusk v.
State,'1 and determined that the challenged juror could "lay aside any
bias or prejudice and render his verdict solely upon the evidence
presented and the instructions on the law given to him by the court."19
In Stano v. State,20 the Florida Supreme Court considered the
scope within which the ability of a juror to implement the Lusk test
could be explored during voir dire. The issue in Stano was whether
trial counsel could ask a potential juror "how""1 they could "block...
out ' 2 2 pretrial publicity relating to the defendant's case and accord-
ingly provide the defendant a verdict based solely on the evidence
presented .2 The trial court sustained an objection to the inquiry as to
"how" the juror could block out the pretrial publicity in satisfying the
Lusk test. In affirming the prohibition imposed by the trial court, the
supreme court found no abuse of discretion. The court relied upon the
decision in Jones v. Stater,24 and stated that: "While 'counsel must
have an opportunity to ascertain latent or concealed prejudgments by
prospective jurors,' it is the trial court's responsibility to control unrea-
sonably repetitious and argumentative voir dire."25 Unfortunately, the
Stano case reflects the difficulty experienced by trial counsel in at-
17. Id.
18. 446 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (Fla.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 229 (1984).
19. 462 So. 2d at 1081. The Mills decision does not describe any reason why the
defendant's brother-in-law was not called by the defendant to testify as to the alleged
opinion of guilt expressed by the potential juror. Further, the Mills opinion is silent as
to any questions asked of the potential juror concerning his knowledge of any particular
facts concerning Mills and/or his background. This area is particularly significant con-
sidering the fact that Mills had four prior burglary convictions.
20. 473 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 1985).
21. Id. at 1284.
22. Id. at 1285.
23. Unfortunately, the Stano opinion does not provide a specific description of
the pretrial publicity except the following generalization "numerous numbers of the
venire for the second trial had been exposed to publicity regarding Stano, the instant
crime, and the first trial." 473 So. 2d at 1285.
24. 378 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 388 So. 2d 1114
(Fla. 1980).
25. 473 So. 2d at 1285 (quoting Jones v. State, 378 So. 2d 797-98 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1979).
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tempting to properly explore an area critical to his client's opportunity
to receive a fair trial. While it is difficult to understand how a question
such as "How can you block out pretrial publicity?" is "unreasonable
repetitious and argumentative,""6 it is obvious that the "how" question
is rather ineffective in achieving the ultimate goal of uncovering latent
or concealed prejudgments.
The question of whether the trial court erred in denying a motion
to excuse for cause two prospective jurors who were employed as cor-
rections officers in the state prison system was reviewed by the court in
State v. Williams.27 The Williams court concluded that no error had
occurred despite the fact that Williams had been charged with battery
of a corrections officer.28 In reaching its decision, the supreme court
quashed the decision of the First District Court of Appeal. 9 The dis-
trict court had relied upon its previous ruling in Irby v. State.30 In Irby
the court found an "appearance and a substantial probability of inher-
ent juror bias" when considering the ability of a corrections officer to
sit as a juror in a case involving a battery of a corrections officer at the
Union Correctional Institute. In Irby, as in Williams, the potential ju-
rors claimed that they could be fair and impartial jurors despite their
employment as a corrections officer. The Williams court concludes that
the Irby court "ignored" 31 the juror's protestations of fairness in reach-
ing its conclusion that the juror should be excused for cause. The court
in Williams held that application of the Lusk test was appropriate in
Williams and that the trial court was in the best position to determine
the actual basis of a juror.32
The person in the best position to determine this actual bias is the
trial judge. The trial judge hears and sees the prospective juror and
has the unique ability to make an assessment of the individual's
candor and the probable certainty of his answers to critical ques-
26. Id. at 1285.
27. 465 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 1985).
28. The corrections officer who was the victim in Williams was employed at the
Union Correctional Institute. The court's opinion is silent as to the location of employ-
ment of the two questioned jurors (corrections officers).
29. Williams v. State, 440 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
30. 436 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1983), review denied, 447 So. 2d
888 (Fla. 1984).
31. 465 So. 2d at 1230.
32. Williams chose to argue in the Supreme Court that the Lusk test announced
by the Supreme Court was not applicable to the "unique" facts of Williams.
1006 [Vol. 10
6
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 4
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss3/4
Criminal Procedure
tions presented to him.33
The result in Williams reflects the supreme court's basic reluctance to
disturb the findings of the trial court in deciding whether the trial court
denied motions to excuse jurors for cause. Unfortunately, the court has
implemented the Lusk test which essentially restricts the trial court
from excusing a juror for cause unless the court finds that the juror
lacked candor in expressing confidence in being able to implement the
Lusk test. The Lusk test is particularly troublesome when the trial
court considers the "candor" of law enforcement personnel who are
under obvious pressure to announce themselves fair in answer to the
question of whether they will sit as fair jurors in a trial. It seems un-
likely that any law enforcement officer would admit to being prejudiced
and even more unlikely that a trial judge will grant a motion to chal-
lenge for cause and thus (as required by Lusk) make a determination
that the official lacked candor.3 4
Defendant's Presence at Trial
The Florida Supreme Court was challenged by two unique ques-
tions concerning a defendant's right to be present at his trial. In Peede
v. State,35 the court considered for the first time whether a defendant
could knowingly and voluntarily waive his presence at a capital trial.
The court considered the question from the perspective of the United
States Supreme Court decisions of Taylor v. United States,"6 in which
a defendant's voluntary absence in a non-capital case operated as a
waiver of his right to be present during all phases of a trial,7 as well as
Drope v. Missouri,38 in which the question of whether a defendant may
waive his presence at a capital trial was specifically left open. The
Peede Court concluded that no valid distinction exists between defend-
ants in capital and non-capital offenses and therefore concluded that a
33. 465 So. 2d at 1231.
34. It seems clear that legislative limitations on the ability of law enforcement
officials to sit on juries is the only visible remedy to the Lusk test.
35. 474 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1985).
36. 414 U.S. 17 (1973).
37. The right of a defendant to be present at the stages of a trial where funda-
mental fairness might be thwarted by his absence derives from the confrontation clause
of the sixth amendment and the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1972).
38. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
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defendant could voluntarily waive his right to be present at a capital
trial just as a defendant could knowingly waive any other constitutional
right. 9 The Peede court recognized that its opinion might be in conflict
with the decision of Proffitt v. Wainwright,4" in which the Eleventh
Circuit found a defendant's presence at a capital trial to be non-waiv-
able. In light of Proffitt, the ultimate viability of Peede would appear
questionable. 41
Despite its ruling in Peede, the court held in Hooper v. State,42
that a trial court had not erred in refusing a request of a defendant to
waive his presence during the jury selection phase of a trial. The
Hooper holding, which ironically was announced on the same day as
Peede, concluded that Hooper's reason for absenting himself (fear that
his physical size might intimidate jurors in their voir dire responses)
did not outweigh what the court called "the ultimate need to be pre-
sent."'43 The Florida Supreme Court did not attempt to reconcile Peede
and Hooper.
Competency
A. Defendant's Competency
The Florida Supreme Court reversed two death sentence convic-
tions of first degree murder in 1985 due to a failure of a trial court to
conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the competency of a crimi-
nal defendant. In Gibson v. State,44 the supreme court found a trial
court's determination of competency merely based upon review of past
medical reports and the trial court's personal observations to be insuffi-
cient. The Gibson court restated its holding in Christopher v. State,45
39. 474 So. 2d at 814. The Peede court looked toward the 1975 Amendment to
Rule 43, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure which abandoned any distinction between
capital and noncapital offenses relating to voluntary absence from criminal trials, as
well as Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.180(b) which similarly lacks a capital -
noncapital distinction.
40. 685 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 U.S. 508 (1983).
41. Peede sought to distinguish Proffitt in two respects. Initially, Peede con-
tended that the Proffitt court had not recognized the elimination of the distinction in
Rule 43 between capital and non-capital cases. Secondly, Peede noted that Proffitt had
alternatively concluded that no knowing or voluntary waiver had been satisfied.
42. 476 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1985).
43. Id. at 1256.
44. 474 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 1985).
45. 416 So. 2d 450, 452 (Fla. 1982).
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which states the responsibility of the trial court to conduct a compe-
tency hearing "whenever it reasonably appears necessary, whether re-
quested or not." .The facts determined to require a hearing in Gibson
included an eight year history of court-ordered examination and peri-
odic hospitalization, as well as a prior determination of incompetency. 6
In Hill v. State,47 the court reversed a first degree murder convic-
tion in which the trial court refused to conduct an evidentiary hearing
to determine competency in which a defendant had been previously di-
agnosed to suffer from grand malepileptic seizures and mental retarda-
tion. Further, during a special education program for mentally handi-
capped children, the defendant had been observed to often times be
blamed for things he did not do, and when accused, often admitted
guilt. Additionally, the defendant's I.Q. was subsequently measured to
have been sixty-six which placed the defendant in the lowest one per-
cent in the general population. The supreme court in Hill specifically
rejected the procedure utilized by the trial court in which it determined
that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary. The trial court only al-
lowed the testimony of the defendant's attorney as well as an investiga-
tor for the defense. The trial court permitted submission of other testi-
mony by deposition. However, the trial court stated that it was not
going to review the depositions since the issue of competency was a
judgment determination for the trial lawyer. The supreme court re-
jected this obvious misapplication of the law.
In Trawick v. State,48 the Florida Supreme Court held that the
trial court did not err in failing to conduct a competency hearing
merely on the fact that the defendant appeared despondent and ambiv-
alent about his guilty plea to first degree murder. Trawick recognized
the obligation placed upon the trial court in Drope v. Missouri,4 9 to
conduct its own inquiry of a defendant's competency if irrational be-
havior or demeanor is displayed. However Trawick's contemplation of
suicide and despondency when viewed in the light of the trial court's
extensive colloquy prior to accepting Trawick's guilty plea were
deemed not to require further hearing.
46. Gibson, 474 So. 2d at 1183.
47. 473 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1985).
48. 473 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 1985).
49. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
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B. Physical Condition of Counsel
While appellate courts generally do not disturb trial courts' discre-
tionary determinations of motions for continuance, the Florida Su-
preme Court was confronted by a trial court's denial of a motion for
continuance based upon the health of defense counsel which the su-
preme court found compelled reversal of a first degree murder
conviction.
In Jackson v. State,50 the supreme court evaluated the unrefuted
record which included the defendant's attorney having suffered a head
injury prior to trial and having received medication for that injury
which resulted in episodes of dizziness and slurred speech. The court
concluded that these circumstances mandated reversal due to the trial
court's failure to grant the motion for continuance due to the inabililty
of the trial counsel to effectively represent his client.
Search and Seizure
Relatively few significant search and seizure issues were consid-
ered by the Florida Supreme Court in 1985. In Lara v. State,51 the
court concluded that an exception to the warrant requirement would be
rooted in exigent circumstances when law enforcement officers conduct
an immediate search of an area to determine the number and condition
of the victims or survivors, to see if the killer is still on the premises
and to preserve the crime scene.52 In State v. Dilyerd,3 the supreme
court implemented the holding of the United States Supreme Court in
Michigan v. Long,54 and found that reasonable suspicion that an unar-
rested person is dangerous supports a warrantless area search of the
passenger compartment of an automobile. As in Long, the Dilyerd
court reached its conclusion despite the fact that the unarrested indi-
vidual had been removed from the automobile prior in time to the
search.
Finally, in Roche v. State,55 the court found the statutory basis
supporting random searches of vehicles in furtherance of agricultural
regulations to be constitutional. The Roche decision was in direct con-
50. 464 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1985).
51. 464 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1985).
52. Id. at 1175.
53. 462 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1985).
54. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
55. 462 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 1985).
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trast to the holding in Lake Butler Apparel Co. v. Department of Agri-
culture and Consumer Services.56 In Lake Butler, the court found the
identical statute to be unconstitutional.
Statements
In Haliburton v. State,57 the Florida Supreme Court considered
the question of whether a defendant who has been advised of his Mi-
randa rights and agrees to answer questions must be advised by his
interrogators that an attorney retained on his behalf desires to speak to
him. The supreme court answered that question in the affirmative, find-
ing that a defendant must be advised that an attorney retained on his
behalf is trying to advise him even if said notification is during the
course of an interrogation. The court reiterated that the determination
of the need for counsel is the defendant's prerogative, citing State v.
Craig,58 and that once informed of the opportunity for advice, the de-
fendant may reject that opportunity. The court specifically rejected any
requirement for law enforcement officials to obey a telephone order of
an attorney to terminate questioning a defendant. 9 It would appear,
however, that the Haliburton opinion has been directly contradicted by
the subsequent United States Supreme Court decision in Moran v.
Burbine.60 In Burbine, the Supreme Court concluded that the failure to
advise a defendant of the efforts of an attorney who had been retained
by the defendant's sister without defendant's knowledge, to contact a
defendant did not deprive the defendant of his right to counsel or de-
feat defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights.
In State v. Inciarrano,61 the Florida Supreme Court confronted a
rather novel factual scenario in which a victim of a homicide had tape
recorded his own murder in his own office. The issue before the court
related to the admissibility of the tape recording which contained the
voice of Inciarrano conversing with the-victim "the sound of a gun be-
ing cocked, five shots being fired by Inciarrano, several groans by the
56. 551 F. Supp. 901 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
57. 476 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1985).
58. 237 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1970).
59. The supreme court similarly found in Valle v. State, 474 So. 2d 796 (Fla.
1985) that an instruction by a public defender to police agents not to question a de-
fendant which is agreed to by the police does not amount to invocation of defendant's
right to counsel and does not compel suppression of a statement.
60. 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
61. 473 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1985).
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victim, the gushing of blood, and the victim falling from his chair to
the floor." 62 The supreme court determined that the Florida Communi-
cations Statute which requires consent to the interception of wire or
oral communications by all parties to the communications did not apply
to the murder tape and therefore suppression of the tape was not man-
dated. While the result announced in Inciarrano is not particularly dra-
matic, the rationale implemented to reach that result is potentially
quite significant. The court analyzed the Florida Communications Stat-
ute and determined that it applied only to communications in which an
individual "Exhibit[ed] an expectation of privacy under circumstances
reasonably justifying such an expectation."6 3
In Cave v. State," the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial
of a motion to suppress a defendant's statements. In Cave, the court
found that he had been fully advised of his Miranda rights and ac-
knowledged his rights. The defendant proceeded to initially proclaim
his innocence. At no time did he ask for counsel or exercise his right to
remain silent. The court found that the defendant's eventual statement
was proper since the law enforcement officials had no obligation to
equate protestation of innocence with implementation of constitutional
rights that require questioning to cease.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Episodes of prosecutorial misconduct were unfortunately not for-
eign to the cases considered by the 1985 Florida Supreme Court. The
court was confronted with a veritable laundry list of improper conduct
and tactics utilized in order to secure criminal convictions. These tac-
tics included use of false testimony, refreshing recollection with inad-
missible and factually inaccurate allegations of defendant's confessions,
withholding of Brady material, attacks on defense counsel, and com-
menting on a defendant's right to remain silent. Although the 1985
supreme court cited impropriety with a high level of disdain, it never-
theless found that misconduct rarely creates grounds for reversal of
criminal convictions. Instead, the supreme court, relying upon the
harmless error rule, generally viewed disciplinary actions against par-
ticular attorneys as the most appropriate remedy for improper
behavior.
62. Id. at 1274.
63. Id. at 1275.
64. 476 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1985).
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Despite obvious awareness of the legendary "golden rule" parame-
ters of closing arguments, prosecutors violated the prohibition against
arguing to the jury that they may well be victims of the defendant's
criminal behavior if they fail to convict him. In State v. Wheeler,65 the
Florida Supreme Court found the following argument to be violative of
the golden rule which mandated reversal:
Ladies and gentlemen, these officers were acting in nothing
but good faith. They know there are drugs out there. It's all over
the place. It's in the school yard, it's in the playground, it's in the
home - it doesn't matter whether you are rich or poor, the drugs
are out there. These officers know there is only one way to stop it
and that is to go after the dealer. Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Dale
Wheeler is one of these people. He is one of these dealers. He is
supplying the drugs that eventually get to the school yards and
eventually get to the school grounds and eventually get into your
own homes. He is one of the people who is supplying this. For him
and people just like him - [at this point defense counsel objected,
asked for a curative instruction, and moved for mistrial, all of
which was denied by the judge].6
Section 924.33, Florida Statutes (1983), codified and adopted the
"harmless error" rule for appeals of criminal convictions. In State v.
Murray,67 the supreme court applied the harmless error rule to
prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments. Consequently, the Mur-
ray court declined to apply its "supervisory power" unless the error was
not harmless. Section 924.33, Florida Statutes (1983) provides that:
No judgment shall be reversed unless the appellate court is of
the opinion, after an examination of all the appeal papers, that er-
ror was committed that injuriously affected the substantial rights
of the appellant. It shall not be presumed that error injuriously af-
fected the substantial rights of the appellant.
Despite the statute, Florida courts had traditionally concluded that
prosecutors' comments on defendants' failure to testify created revers-
ible error regardless of the harmless error statute. However, in State v.
Marshall,"' the court applied the harmless error rule to any comment
65. 468 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1985).
66. Id. at 981.
67. 443 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1984).
68. 476 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1985).
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which refers to any comment upon defendant's failure to testify.69 In
abandoning its per se reversal rule, the Marshall court referred to four
factors. Initially, the supreme court looked to court decisions which
have determined comments upon silence not to be fundamental error.70
Secondly, the Marshall court looked to the United States Supreme
Court decisions in Chapman v. California,7t and United States v. Has-
tings, 2 which found the harmless error rule to be consistent with the
federal constitution. Third, the harmless error rule was described as a
preferred method of promoting the administration of justice. Finally,
the Marshall court turned to the Florida legislative intent as encom-
passed within Section 924.33.
Consequently, as a result of Marshall, comments upon the failure
of a defendant to testify must be evaluated according to the harmless
error rule with the state having the burden of establishing the comment
to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 73
In Bertolotti v. State,4 the Florida Supreme Court criticized a
prosecutor's closing comments to a jury during a death sentence hear-
ing. In that argument, the prosecutor proceeded to comment on the
defendant's right to remain silent, violated the golden rule by inviting
the jury to imagine the victim's pain, terror and defenselessness, and
also asked them to send a message to the community at large. The
Bertolotti court concluded that since the penalty phase of a murder
trial only results in a nonbinding recommendation, misconduct must be
"egregious" and so outrageous so as to taint the validity of the recom-
mendation of the jury. The court did, however, launch into a stern
admonition of the prosecutor's conduct. The court restated its prescrip-
tion to remedy similar misconduct by professional sanction of the indi-
vidual attorney and not at the expense of the citizens by mistrial of
69. See David v. State, 369 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1979); Trafficante v. State, 92 So.
2d 811 (Fla. 1957); and Way v. State, 67 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1953).
70. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967); Clark v. State, 363 So.
2d 331 (Fla. 1978).
71. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
72. 461 U.S. 499 (1983). In Hastings the Supreme Court set forth the issue to
be decided by the reviewing court "absent the prosecutor's allusion to the failure of the
defense to proffer evidence to rebut the testimony of the victim, it is clear beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty," 461 U.S. at
510-11.
73. 476 So. 2d at 153.
74. 476 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1985).
75. 476 So. 2d at 133.
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reversal and remand.7 6
Nondisclosure of Information
On several occasions in 1985, the Florida Supreme Court consid-
ered cases in which prosecutors failed to provide required information
to the defense. In Arrango v. State,7 the supreme court reversed a first
degree murder conviction due to the state's failure to disclose the exis-
tence of evidence which had been requested by the defense pursuant to
Brady v. Maryland.78 The Arrango court concluded that the evidence
in question had been (1) requested by the defense and suppressed by
the prosecution (2) favorable in character for the defendant and (3)
material to the outcome of the trial.79
In Brown v. State,80 the supreme court reviewed the trial court's
exclusion of certain evidence which the state had inadvertently not dis-
closed to the defense in discovery. The supreme court found that the
trial court properly conducted a Richardson hearing (as provided in
Richardson v. State81), and remedied the substantial discovery viola-
tion in a manner consistent with the seriousness of the breach.
Finally, in Francis v. Stater,82 the supreme court refused to grant
a new trial despite the fact that the prosecutor had failed to provide the
exact details of the reward to be provided a state witness for her testi-
mony. The court found the relevant facts of the witness' "deal" with
the state had been made known to the jury and thus the nondisclosed
facts did not deprive Francis of due process of law or a fair trial.
Jury Instructions
Parties and courts in Florida criminal cases are guided by stan-
dard jury instructions. While the Florida Supreme Court has approved
these standard jury instructions, the supreme court also requires the
trial court to individualize each case with appropriate instructions.8 3
76. State v. Murray, 443 So. 2d 955, 956 (Fla. 1984).
77. 467 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1985).
78. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
79. 467 So. 2d at 694.
80. 473 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1985).
81. 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1985).
82. 473 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1985).
83. In re Use by Trial Courts of Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases,
431 So. 2d 594, 598, modified 431 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1981).
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Consequently, in Yohn v. State,4 the instruction relating to insanity
was deemed to be insufficient by the supreme court and thus requiring
reversal of a manslaughter conviction.
In Rotenberry v. State,85 the supreme court closely scrutinized the
standard entrapment instruction before deeming it sufficient.
Entrapment
In 1985, the Florida Supreme Court considered several cases relat-
ing to the issue of "entrapment." Specifically, in State v. Wheeler,86 the
supreme court defined the burden of proof to be carried by the prosecu-
tion and defense in entrapment cases. Wheeler defines the initial bur-
den of adducing any evidence of entrapment as being the defendant's.
The trial court is then responsible to determine the sufficiency of the
evidence of entrapment. If a sufficient level of evidence relating to en-
trapment has been established, the prosecution then bears the burden
of disproving entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt. The issue of
whether the prosecution has disproved entrapment beyond a reasonable
doubt is a jury question which must be preceeded by a proper jury
instruction. That jury instruction may not, however, include any ele-
ment describing the defendant's burden to adduce evidence.87 Wheeler
describes the level of evidence required to be adduced by the defendant
as "[E]vidence which suggests the possibility of entrapment ... "I'
The usual method the state uses to disprove entrapment is to prove
the predisposition of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Proving
predisposition may be accomplished in a variety of ways. The state may
show that the defendant had prior convictions or a reputation for en-
gaging in prior similar illicit acts or by showing the defendant's "ready
acquiescence" to commit the crime.89
In Cruz v. State,90 the supreme court considerd whether a "subjec-
tive" and "objective" entrapment doctrine could co-exist. The subjec-
tive entrapment doctrine focuses upon the predisposition of the defend-
ant.91 The determination of predisposition is normally a question for
84. 476 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1985).
85. 468 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1985).
86. 468 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1985).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 465 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1985).
91. Id.
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the jury to determine.9 2 However, in Cruz, the supreme court was con-
cerned that certain police conduct inducing crime was so egregious that
the predisposition of a defendant to commit a crime became irrelevant.
Cruz adopts an objective doctrine of entrapment to address such a cir-
cumstance.93 The determination of whether "objective entrapment" has
occurred is one to be decided by the court. In providing guidance to
courts, the Cruz court sets forth a threshhold test of an entrapment
defense. The court is required to first decide whether the questioned
police activity is directed at a specific ongoing criminal activity or is in
reality manufacturing crime. The second element of the test is directed
to determining whether law enforcement officers utilized means reason-
ably tailored to apprehend those involved in the ongoing criminal activ-
ity.94 Cruz described the first prong of its test in terms of a "but for"
analysis. The court must determine "but for" the police activity would
there have been a crime. The second prong of Cruz which evaluates
techniques utilized to induce an individual to participate in the criminal
activity. Cruz directs courts to two particular situations in which law
enforcement officers make knowing false representations designed to in-
duce the belief that the illegal conduct is not prohibited or by employ-
ing methods of persuasion or inducement which creates the substantial
risk that the offense will be committed by persons other than those
ready to commit said offense. 5
In State v. Glosson,98 the supreme court held that the due process
clause of the Florida Constitution (Article I, Section 9) requires dis-
missal of criminal charges where constitutional due process rights of a
defendant are violated by governmental misconduct regardless of the
defendant's predisposition. In Glosson, the supreme court found a con-
tingent fee agreement with an informant violated the Florida due pro-
cess clause when the agreement was conditional on cooperation and tes-
timony which was critical to a successful prosecution.
Effective Assistance of Counsel
The significant quantity of death penalty cases submitted to the
Florida Supreme Court has predictably led to numerous issues relating
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 465 So. 2d at 522.
95. Id.
96. 462 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1985).
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to the effectiveness of trial and appellate counsel.
In Sireci v. State,97 the supreme court reiterated its reliance upon
the United States Supreme Court's two pronged test to determine a
post conviction challenge to effective assistance of counsel. That test as
set forth in Strickland v. Washington:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose results is reliable.98
In Sireci, the claimed error involved defense counsel's failure to cross-
examine a state witness. The Florida Supreme Court accepted the testi-
mony of Sireci's trial counsel that the failure to cross-examine was in-
tended to properly preserve a state discovery violation. Sireci found the
defense counsel's strategy to be reasonable within prevailing profes-
sional norms.
Numerous 1985 Florida Supreme Court cases discussed the issue
of effective assistance of appellate counsel. The right to effective assis-
tance of appellate counsel was restated in Wilson v. Wainwright.9" In
Wilson and in Dardin v. State,100 the criteria required to establish inef-
fective assistance of appellate counsel were stated:
Petitioner must show 1) specific errors or omissions which show
that appellate counsel's performance deviated from the norm or fell
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and 2)
the deficiency of that performance compromised the appellate pro-
cess to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the fairness
and correctness of the appellate result.101
Utilizing this test, the supreme court concluded that appellate counsel
was not ineffective in by failing to read appellate briefs of all poten-
tially relevant cases pending before the supreme court prior to prepara-
97. 469 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1985).
98. 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984).
99. 474 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1985).
100. 475 So. 2d 214, 215 (Fla. 1985).
101. 474 So. 2d at 1166 (quoting Johnson v. Wainwright, 463 So. 2d 207 (Fla.
1985)).
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tion of his brief;102 failing to file as supplementary authority supreme
court authority coming after defendant's oral argument;10 3 failing to
raise nonfundamental issues relating to jury instructions in penalty
phase which had not been objected to in the trial court;104 and failing
to argue certain prosecutorial comments.105 In Jones v. Wainwright,"0 6
the supreme court found appellate counsel not to have been ineffective
for not arguing alleged improper prosecutorial argument which trial
counsel had not objected to. The Jones court concluded that
"[C]ounsel was not ineffective for not raising an issue which had no
chance of success on appeal."1' 07
While challenges relating to effectiveness of counsel were generally
unsuccessful, the supreme court in Wilson v. Wainwright,0 8 found ap-
pellate counsel to be ineffective. The elements of ineffectiveness cited in
Wilson included failure to brief issues relating to sufficiency of evidence
and propriety of death penalty, lack of preparation and zeal during oral
argument. Illustrative of appellate counsel's failure is the following
excerpt:
THE COURT: ...You don't consider [the legality of the sen-
tence] with any materiality or relevance in a case where . . . the
death penalty has been imposed, sir?
CONNER: Uh, those particular points about the aggravating and
mitigating circumstance, uh, I felt the prior decision of this court
were clear that with the aggravating circumstances as found by the
court, that and with no mitigating circumstances that it was, uh, in
an area where the court had already decided, unless something has
changed in the interim.
THE COURT: Well, let me ask a question. Do you feel that death
is the appropriate punishment if he is guilty.
CONNER: It's, it's quite possible, yes sir. Uh, there was sufficient
evidence in this case for the jury to find premeditation and they did
find premeditation.
Later in the argument, the discussion continued:
THE COURT: Would you agree that the evidence concerning the
102. 475 So. 2d at 214.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 476 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1985).
106. 473 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1985).
107. Id. at 1245.
108. 474 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1985).
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fact of his committing first degree murder in this instance was
pretty overwhelming?
CONNER: I would say that it was overwhelming.
THE COURT: May I ask you this please sir. Now, on the one
hand, if I'm reading it correctly, you're saying that there is no
question about the guilt and then your statement of the guilt there
that the death penalty is appropriate. Am I misunderstanding you?
CONNER: No, I don't - I don't think I meant to say that if
that's the way it came out.109
Conclusion
The 1985 session of the Florida Supreme Court provided several
opportunities for the court to address significant issues in the subject of
criminal procedure. The focus of the court was persuaded by the nature
of the cases which it was required to review. Nevertheless, the Florida
Supreme Court criminal procedure decisions illustrate the difficult re-
sponsibility which the court has assumed to balance the needs of soci-
ety with the rights of individuals.
109. Id. at 1164.
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